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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,' a per curiam decision (with five
separate concurrences) by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court found the
death penalty to be unconstitutional because it gave juries an "untram-
meled discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty."2 In a now
famous quote, Justice Stewart wrote in his concurrence that it was "cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual."' Juries could simply impose the death penalty in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.4 Justice Stewart went on to say, "I simply con-
clude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."' As it
stood, there were no objective standards as to in which cases the death
penalty should be properly imposed on a defendant.6
* Capital lawyer and Adjunct Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196 n.47 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
holding of Furman).
3. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. See id. at 309-10.
5. Id. at 310.
6. See id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he death penalty is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.").
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As a result of Furman, states passed new death sentencing schemes
in order to overcome this "it just strikes by lightening" problem. Thirty-
five states passed new legislation attempting to narrow those who could
be sentenced to death and setting out the procedures and safeguards for
sentencing someone to death.7 Four years later, Justice Stewart joined
the plurality in upholding the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia.8 Geor-
gia had created a "carefully drafted statute"9 that ensured that, in a bifur-
cated proceeding (guilt/innocence and penalty), the sentencer is given
adequate information and guidance relevant to the imposition of the
death penalty.' ° There must be "specific jury findings as to the circum-
stances of the crime or the character of the defendant."" Justices Black-
mun and Stevens joined Justice Stewart's plurality opinion.' 2 A decision
released the same day, Proffitt v. Florida,3 upheld the sentencing
scheme in Florida. Justices Powell, Stewart, and Stevens (with four
other justices concurring) found that under the Florida statutes, the trial
judge was required to "weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances," as well as the facts of the crime, 4 "when he determines
the sentence to be imposed on a defendant,""'
There was some discussion then about whether a judge and not a
jury could make the final decision.' 6 The plurality stated that it "never
suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required. And it would
appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater
consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punish-
ment, since a trial judge is more experienced ... than a jury . ."I I And
since any risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing would be mini-
mized by a review of the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida statute was
constitutional.' 8 A bifurcated trial, specified aggravating and mitigating
factors, and a subsequent review by the Florida Supreme Court as to
proportionality satisfied the Court's concerns for any challenges to the
constitutionality of the death penalty.' 9 The Court concluded that "[t]he
Florida capital-sentencing procedures thus seek to assure that the death
7. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80.
8. Id. at 158, 207.
9. Id. at 195.
10. Id. at 162-68 (discussing Georgia's statutory scheme for imposing the death penalty).
11. Id. at 198.
12. Id. at 158.
13. 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
14. Id at 250.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 252.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 252-53.
19. Id. at 245-46, 250-53.
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penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. "20
In Proffitt, the Court went on to address the challenge to the Florida
sentencing scheme that arbitrariness is inevitable because discretion can
be exercised at every stage of a prosecution.21 The challenger also
argued that the new sentencing scheme did not end the arbitrary "inflic-
tion of death" because the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
were overbroad and vague and the statute provided no guidance "as to
how the mitigating and aggravating circumstances should be weighed in
any specific case.I 22 All these challenges were rejected by the Court.
The plurality also stated:
While the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authori-
ties do not have numerical weights assigned to them, the require-
ments of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's
discretion is guided and channeled by requiring examination of spe-
cific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death
penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its
imposition.24
It then concluded:
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida statute are
sufficiently clear and precise to enable the various aggravating cir-
cumstances to be weighed against the mitigating ones....
Th[e] legislation provides that there shall be an informed, focused,
guided, and objective inquiry into the question whether he should be
sentenced to death.25
In Florida, there must be at least one statutory "aggravating" factor pre-
sent before the state is permitted to seek death.26
For the next thirty-six years, the U.S. Supreme Court decided liter-
ally hundreds of cases which refined, redefined, ignored, or changed ele-
ments of the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court has dealt with
many more than that. But the fundamental question after Gregg and
Proffitt, which has plagued the death penalty world ever since, remains:
Is this "focus on the individual circumstances of each homicide and each
defendant, ' 27 theoretically and as applied, enough to overcome the basic
"strikes by lightening" problem?
20. Id. at 252-53.
21. See generally id. at 254-58.
22. Id. at 254.
23. See id. at 254-59.
24. Id. at 258.
25. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added).
26. FLA STAT. § 921.141(3)(a).
27. Id. at 252.
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This discussion begins with a general inquiry into whether subse-
quent death penalty decisions in Florida-whether by the jury, the trial
court, or the Florida Supreme Court-were "informed, focused, guided,
and objective. ' 8 Many questions remain as to just how specific and
narrowed the death penalty system in Florida is and how should it be
tailored to bolster the claim that it is no longer applied in an arbitrary
and capricious manner nor "wantonly and ...freakishly imposed. 29
How much of a focused and guided inquiry is constitutionally sufficient
and is it only "total" arbitrariness and capriciousness that causes a con-
stitutional defect? What about substantial arbitrariness and capricious-
ness? Can a jury and a judge ever weigh the aggravating factors against
the mitigating factors in an "objective" way? Have the Florida legisla-
ture and the Florida Supreme Court expanded the cases in which death
can be imposed contrary to the spirit and holding of Proffitt?
II. DEATH PENALTY LAW IN FLORIDA
Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes sets out the procedures and
criteria for the imposition of the death penalty.3" If the state seeks death
in the first instance31 (more on this below), then once a person is con-
victed of first-degree murder there will be a separate proceeding as to
the death penalty.32 The jury shall render an "advisory sentence" to the
court, to which the court must give great weight.33 The court shall then
weigh the proven aggravating factors against the mitigating factors and
decide which to give the greater weight.34 If the aggravating factors out-
weigh the mitigating factors, then death is the proper sentence.
III. THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Again, the purpose of specific statutory aggravating factors was to
narrow the kinds of cases in which one could be sentenced to death.35 In
Proffitt, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "On their face these procedures,
like those used in Georgia, appear to meet the constitutional deficiencies
28. See id. at 259.
29. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2012).
31. According to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a] capital trial is defined as any
first-degree murder case in which the State has not formally waived the death penalty on the
record." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.112(B).
32. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1).
33. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2). However, "[in order to sustain a sentence of death following a
jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910
(Fla. 1975) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
34. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3).
35. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
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identified in Furman. The sentencing authority in Florida, the trial judge,
is directed to weigh eight aggravating factors against seven mitigat-
ing [14] factors to determine whether the death penalty shall be
imposed. 36
However, the number of aggravating factors in Florida has
expanded dramatically since the U.S. Supreme Court first ruled in Prof-
fitt.37 In fact, the legislature has doubled the number of aggravating fac-
tors that were present in 1976-from eight to now sixteen 8.3  Some
examples of aggravating factors that have come into existence subse-
quent to Proffitt are if the victim was a law-enforcement officer in the
performance of his or her duties,39 if the victim was an elected official in
the performance of his or duties,4 if the victim was under twelve years
of age,4' if the crime was committed by a "gang member,"4 or if the
victim was an older, vulnerable person due to advanced age.43 If one of
these new aggravators exists, the state can seek death.
The problem with many of these post-Proffitt aggravating factors-
apart from significantly expanding those who would now be eligible for
the death penalty-is that the focus shifts more and more to who the
victims are rather than who the defendant is and whether he should or
should not be executed for the crime. In an otherwise non-capital case,
the fact that the victim was a policeman, a government official, a child
under twelve years of age, or a vulnerable person of advanced age would
now tend to make it a capital case. There are many instances in which a
person who would not be eligible for the death penalty at the time of
Proffitt would now be eligible.
IV. RACE
The U.S Supreme Court failed to deal with the fundamental Ameri-
can problem of race when it concluded in McCleskey v. Kemp' that a
comprehensive study by academic David Baldus, showing the "racially
disproportionate impact" of the death penalty in Georgia, was not
enough to overturn a death sentence.45 A defendant must fail in his chal-
lenge to the sentence if he cannot show that it was the result of an actual
36. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
37. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(a)-(p) (2012).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 921.141(5)0).
40. Id. § 921.141(5)(k).
41. Id. § 921.141(5)(1).
42. Id. § 921.141(5)(n).
43. Id. § 921.141(5)(m).
44. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
45. See id. at 298-99, 319.
20131
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"discriminatory purpose. 4 6 The Court went on to say that a defendant
"must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discrimina-
tory purpose,'47 and dismissed evidence of general disparities in sen-
tencing, such as the Baldus study, as "an inevitable part of our criminal
justice system."48
Race has always been an issue in death penalty cases. 49 In his con-
currence in Furman, Justice Stewart said, "My concurring Brothers have
demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these
few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis
of race. But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one
side." 0
In 2012, 59% of those on Florida's death row were white, 37%
were black, and 4% were Hispanic.5 A 2006 report by the American
Bar Association found that while Florida has undertaken three initiatives
exploring the impact of racial discrimination in the criminal justice sys-
tem, Florida "should fully investigate and evaluate the impact of racial
discrimination ... and develop strategies that strive to eliminate it."
52
In 1991, researchers Michael L. Radelet and Glenn L. Pierce
reviewed the empirical research on Florida and found that eleven differ-
ent studies "give strong evidence of racial disparities in capital sentenc-
ing in Florida. ' 53 A more recent study concluded that the "racial
composition of the jury pool has a substantial impact on conviction
rates. '54 All-white jury pools in Florida convicted black defendants six-
teen percent more often than white defendants. In cases with no black
potential jurors in the jury pool, black defendants were convicted eighty-
46. See id. at 297-99.
47. Id at 292.
48. Id. at 312.
49. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 433 (1995)
(stating that the death penalty has always disproportionately affected the poor and racial
minorities).
50. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes and
citation omitted).
51. Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP'T. OF CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/activeinmates/
deathrowroster.asp.
52. ABA DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT & FLA. DEATH PENALTY
ASSESSMENT TEAM, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS:
THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 353-55 (2006) [hereinafter ABA PROJECT],
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessment
project/florida/report.authcheckdam.pdf.
53. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the
Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1991).
54. Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1017,
1020 (2012).
55. Id. at 1035.
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one percent of the time, while white defendants were convicted sixty-six
percent of the time.56 When at least one member of the jury pool was
black, the conviction rates for white (73%) and black (71%) defendants
were nearly identical.57
In its 2006 report, the ABA concluded that "Jurisdictions should
fully investigate and evaluate the impact of racial discrimination in their
criminal justice systems and develop strategies that strive to eliminate
it."'58 The 2006 ABA report came up with ten recommendations to deal
with the unresolved problem of race as a factor in capital cases.5 9 Flor-
ida, like other states, has failed to adequately deal with the fundamental
issue of race and fairness.
V. FELONY MURDER
One of the statutory aggravating factors in Florida is felony mur-
der.60 Section 921.141(5)(d) of the Florida Statutes states that if the kill-
ing "was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice in, the commission of [certain enumerated felonies]," this
would be an aggravating factor and thus make one eligible for death.6'
The felony-murder doctrine is that if one commits a specified felony and
a murder takes place, it does not matter if the perpetrator had no intent to
kill.62 Because a person was committing an underlying felony, that per-
son is responsible for all the consequences, intended and unintended. If
one commits a specified underlying crime (e.g., robbery, sexual battery,
aggravated child abuse, arson, or burglary) and a killing occurs, this
would be an aggravating factor that would make one eligible for death in
Florida.63
The Florida Supreme Court defends this aggravating factor by
claiming that it does narrow the imposition of the death penalty:
Eligibility for this aggravating circumstance is not automatic: The list
of enumerated felonies in the provision defining felony murder is
larger than the list of enumerated felonies in the provision defining
the aggravating circumstance of commission during the course of an
enumerated felony. A person can commit felony murder via traffick-
ing, carjacking, aggravated stalking, or unlawful distribution, and yet
be ineligible for this particular aggravating circumstance. This
56. Id. at 1019.
57. Id.
58. ABA PRoJEcT, supra note 52, at 351 (Recommendation #1).
59. See id. at 353-66.
60. FLA. STAT. § 921.14(5)(d) (2012).
61. Id.
62. Lewis v. State, 34 So. 3d 183, 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
63. FLA. STAT. § 921.14(5)(d) (2012).
20131
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scheme thus narrows the class of death-eligible defendants.
64
But given all the aggravating factors and the fact that almost all the
felony-murder crimes are aggravating, it is very difficult to find a first-
degree murder case in which there is not at least one aggravating fac-
tor.6 ' The overall effect of this is to widen rather than narrow in any
meaningful way the cases in which death can be sought.66
Now first-degree murder, when perpetrated with a premeditated
design to effect the death of another (malice aforethought), is not by
itself enough to warrant the death penalty.67 So, if you intend to kill (and
that is all) you cannot get the death penalty. But, if you do not intend to
kill, you can nevertheless be subject to the death penalty. Under speci-
fied circumstances, such as participating in a robbery when the "degree
of participation in the crimes was major rather than minor, and the
record would support a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless
indifference to human life," a person is eligible for the death penalty
even though he or she did not intend to kill the victim.
68
Another twist to the felony-murder statute concerns a defendant
who kills more than one person in a rage without premeditation. The
first person killed would not be a first-degree murder case because it was
committed in reckless disregard for life but without any premeditation.
However the second person killed-even though the intent is the
same-would nevertheless be a first-degree felony murder based on the
simultaneous murder of another human being. In other words the first
murder was a second-degree murder, but it was also an enumerated fel-
ony and therefore the defendant could be eligible for the death penalty
for the second homicide.69
VI. PRIOR VIOLENT CRIME
One of the more serious statutory aggravating factors is "[t]he
defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person."7 It would
appear at first blush that this is meant to punish someone who was and
continues to be violent. This is sometimes, but not always, the case.
64. Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d. 7, 11 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
65. See O.H. Eaton, Jr., Capital Punishment: An Examination of Current Issues and Trends
and How These Developments May Impact The Death Penalty in Florida, 34 STETSON L. REv. 9,
49 (2004).
66. See id. (quoting Blanco, 706 So. 2d at 12 (Anstead, J., concurring)).
67. See FLA. STAT. § 921.14(3) (2012). (requiring the existence of an aggravating factor to
impose the death penalty).
68. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 151 (1987).
69. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2)(o).
70. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(b) (2012).
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Prosecutors are also permitted to use a crime committed subsequent
to the charged crime to establish an aggravating factor.71 Even though
that crime was committed after the murder in question, the prosecutor
can still use it.72 Prosecutors often prosecute the subsequent case first in
order to create this aggravating factor. The Florida Supreme Court has
concluded that this is a valid practice because the statute is silent on
when the prior violent felony has to occur.
7 3
Moreover, the state can also use a violent crime committed simulta-
neously with the current murder to establish a prior violent offense.74
Thus if a person has no prior record for any violent felony, this aggravat-
ing factor is nevertheless provable by a conviction for another violent
crime that happened at the same time as the murder.75 For example, if a
person commits two homicides, these are considered separate violent
acts.76 The Florida Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that where a
defendant is convicted of multiple murders, arising from the same crimi-
nal episode, the contemporaneous conviction as to one victim may sup-
port the finding of the prior violent felony aggravator as to the murder of
another victim."7 7 Although it would carry considerably less weight,
even a simultaneous aggravated assault is admissible to prove a prior
violent felony.78
VII. COLD, CALCULATED, AND PREMEDITATED
One of the most serious aggravating factors is cold, calculated, and
premeditated killing ("CCP"). The Florida Supreme Court has said that
CCP is something much more than regular premeditation, which is mal-
ice aforethought.7 9 It would be "heightened premeditation. '"80 While it
has never been clear how much premeditation would have to be height-
ened, the Florida Supreme Court has continuously expanded the circum-
stances that could show this "heightened premeditation."
Historically, in order to establish the CCP aggravating factor, the
evidence must show
that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold), and
71. Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 434 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam) (citing Elledge v. State, 346
So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977)).
72. See id.
73. See Elledge, 346 So. 2d at 1001.
74. Snelgrove v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S303, S308 (Fla. Apr. 19, 2012) (per curiam).
75. Id.
76. Frances v. State, 970 So. 2d 806, 816-17 (Fla. 2007) (per curiarn).
77. Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 136 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam).
78. See Scott v. State, 66 So. 3d 923, 935 (Fla. 2011) (per curian).
79. See Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 115-16 (Fla. 2008) (per curiun).
80. Id.
2013]
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that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit
murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and that the defendant
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.
"'CCP involves a much higher degree of premeditation' than is required
to prove first-degree murder.
82
Careful planning can now be just before the crime itself.83 The
Florida Supreme Court has also widened the circumstances in which a
"careful plan" can be made by not requiring much thinking to go into a
plan to be considered "careful."84 It has simultaneously expanded the
circumstances in which the state can demonstrate "heightened premedi-
tation" and the kind of evidence that can arguably show that this height-
ened premeditation is present.
For example, the Florida Supreme Court has cited the defendant's
procurement of a weapon in advance of the crime as indicative of prepa-
ration and a heightened premeditated design. Heightened premedita-
tion can be also be established by examining the circumstances of the
killing and the conduct of the accused. The CCP aggravating factor "can
also be indicated by . . . lack of resistance or provocation, and the
appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course. "86
In Buzia v. State,87 the Florida Supreme Court found that the
defendant
had the opportunity to leave the residence with the [victim's] money
and valuables without committing further harm. We have "found...
heightened premeditation . .. where a defendant had the opportunity
to leave the crime scene and not commit the murder but, instead,
commit[ted] the murder." We conclude in part that, by remaining
there and murdering [the victim], Buzia developed "heightened
premeditation. ' 88
81. Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182, 192 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson v. State,
648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam)).
82. Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 381-82 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Foster v.
State, 778 So. 2d 906, 921 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam)).
83. See Mason v. State, 438 So. 2d 374, 379 (Fla. 1983) (concluding that breaking into a
house, procuring a weapon inside the house, and attacking the victim in her bed demonstrated
sufficient planning to qualify as CCP).
84. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 802 So. 2d 1121, 1133 (Fla. 2001) (holding that killing qualified
as CCP where defendant used multiple weapons and had to stop and reload the weapons prior to
shooting the victims); Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994) (holding that the killing was
calculated when defendant tied up the victim and taunted her prior to killing her).
85. Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam).
86. Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam); see also Thompson v.
State, 648 So. 2d 692, 696 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam) (explaining that defendant took precaution of
carrying a gun and a knife with him to a meeting with the victims).
87. 926 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
88. Id. at 1214-15 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 67:413
THE FALSE PROMISE OF PROFFITr
The court went on to say:
Most importantly, during this final lapse of time, Buzia procured
his own weapon. "[T]he facts supporting [the CCP aggravator] must
focus on the manner in which the crime was executed, e.g., advance
procurement of weapon, lack of provocation, killing carried out as a
matter of course. . . ." We have found the CCP aggravator where the
defendant procured a weapon beforehand. However, such procure-
ment need not [30] be that far in advance. In Jackson, the defendant
went upstairs, obtained a gun, and made a deliberate and conscious
choice to shoot a law enforcement officer. We found heightened pre-
meditation because the defendant could have left the scene, but
instead purposely returned with the gun to confront the officer. We
have found the CCP aggravator in other cases where the defendant
did not procure his own murder weapon before arriving at the
scene. 
89
It is increasingly more and more difficult to distinguish what is and
is not CCP and just how heightened the premeditation must be. Again,
the Florida Supreme Court has expanded the criteria under which an
aggravating factor can be established and proven. In so doing, it has also
once again expanded rather than narrowed the circumstances under
which a person can be sentenced to death.
VIII. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
Subsequent to Proffitt, Florida adopted a statute that now permits
"victim impact" testimony in the sentencing phase of a capital case.9'
"[T]he prosecution may introduce, and subsequently argue, victim
impact evidence to the jury. Such evidence shall be designed to demon-
strate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the
resultant loss to the community's members by the victim's death."9 In
Payne v. Tennessee92 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its precedent
and stated, "We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that sub-
ject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."
'9 3
The problem is that victim impact testimony can be very prejudicial
because it focuses the jury's attention on the emotions of the victim's
family and friends instead of the facts that should be considered, such as
the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant.94 The
89. Id. at 1215 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7) (2012).
91. Id.
92. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
93. Id. at 827.
94. See id. at 860-61, 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2013]
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risk that the jury will make an emotional and not a rational decision is
very much enhanced.
In Florida, the sentencing procedures are that a jury must weigh the
aggravating factors against the mitigating factors.95 It is difficult to fig-
ure out how this victim impact evidence is to be incorporated into the
jury's recommendation. The jury is later instructed by the judge:
You have heard evidence about the impact of this homicide on the
1. family, 2. friends, 3. community .... However, you may not con-
sider this evidence as an aggravating circumstance. Your recommen-
dation to the court must be based on the aggravating circumstances
and the mitigating circumstances upon which you have been
instructed.
9 6
Any juror would think that if victim impact evidence is presented
and argued then he or she could indeed consider it as an aggravating
factor. It is counterintuitive (and indeed intellectually dishonest) to allow
a jury to hear this and then tell the jury that it cannot consider this emo-
tional evidence when determining aggravating factors.
I.. NON-UNANIMOUS JURY AND RING PROBLEMS
In Florida it is the judge who ultimately sentences the defendant
giving "great weight and deference by the Court in determining which
punishment to impose." 97 All but three states (Florida, Alabama and
Delaware) "require, at least, a unanimous jury finding of aggravators." 98
In Florida, if the recommendation by the jury is seven in favor of death
and five in favor of life, that is nevertheless a death recommendation.99
Florida is the only state that allows over forty percent of the jury to
believe that life is the appropriate sentence and yet the recommendation
is death. Judges are required to give great weight to the jury's recom-
mendation.100 In the vast majority of cases, judges will follow the rec-
ommendation of the jury.
In 2005, the Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Steele, urged the
legislature to change the sentencing law before it was subject to a consti-
tutional challenge:
The bottom line is that Florida is now the only state in the coun-
try that allows the death penalty to be imposed even though the pen-
95. See generally FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 7.11 (2012
[hereinafter JURY INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury.
instructions/chapters/entireversion/ onlinejurryinstructions.pdf.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. State v Steele. 921 So. 2d 538, 548 (Fla. 2005).
99. Id. at 550.
100. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 95, at 7.11.
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alty-phase jury may determine by a mere majority vote both whether
aggravators exist and whether to recommend the death penalty.
Assuming that our system continues to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny, we ask the Legislature to revisit it to decide whether it wants
Florida to remain the outlier state. ' 0 1
Moreover, there is no requirement for a special verdict form for jurors to
find the same aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
As retired Florida Supreme Court Justice Cantero stated, "if a capi-
tal sentencing scheme requires only a simple majority to decide whether
[aggravating] factors exist and determine their relative weight, it will
still fail to produce 'consistent and rational' outcomes or 'minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"' as prohibited by Gregg
and Proffitt.
10 2
For many, the fact that the judge makes the final decision and not
the jury flies in the face of Ring v. Arizona. 3 In Ring, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of
a fact that raised the defendant's maximum penalty to death.'" Under
the U.S. Constitution, it is the jury not the judge who is required to make
105such factual decisions.
Florida's capital sentencing statute seems to be exactly the same as
the one overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ring. Like Arizona,
the death penalty is imposed after the judge makes factual findings as to
the existence of aggravating factors.1"6 Further, "[n]otwithstanding the
recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life
imprisonment or death."'1 7 Like Arizona, a defendant cannot be sen-
tenced to death without additional findings of fact made by the judge,
not the jury."0 8 One of the issues was articulated by Florida Supreme
Court Justice Pariente:
In short, what is of concern about Florida's death penalty
scheme in light of Ring is that our statute appears to reverse the tradi-
tional roles of the judge and the jury in sentencing.... [U]nder Flor-
ida's sentencing scheme the jury's role is to advise the judge on the
sentence, and it can make a recommendation of death based on a bare
101. Steele, 921 So. 2d at 550.
102. Raoul G. Cantero & Robert M. Kline, Death is Different: The Need for Jury Unanimity in
Death Penalty Cases, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 4, 17 (2009).
103. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
104. Id. at 609.
105. Id.
106. See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2012).
107. Id. § 921.141(3) (2012).
108. See id.
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majority. The jury does not find specific aggravating factors. Thus, it
is the jury that recommends a sentence and the judge who finds the
specific aggravators.'"
In Evans v. McNeil," Io Federal District Court Judge Martinez found
another a violation of Ring:
As the Florida sentencing statute currently operates in practice, the
Court finds that the process completed before the imposition of the
death penalty is in violation of Ring in that the jury's recommenda-
tion is not a factual finding sufficient to satisfy the Constitution;
rather, it is simply a sentencing recommendation made without a
clear factual finding. In effect, the only meaningful findings regard-
ing aggravating factors are made by the judge.
... There are no specific findings of fact made by the jury. Indeed,
the reviewing courts never know what aggravating or mitigating fac-
tors the jury found. It is conceivable that some of the jurors did not
find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, or that each juror
found a different aggravating circumstance, or perhaps all jurors
found the existence of an aggravating circumstance but some thought
that the mitigating circumstances outweighed them. . . . After the
jury's recommendation, there is a separate sentencing hearing con-
ducted before the judge only.... The defendant has no way of know-
ing whether or not the jury found that [sic] same aggravating factors
as the judge. Indeed, the judge, unaware of the aggravating factor or
factors found by the jury, may find an aggravating circumstance that
was not found by the jury while failing to find the aggravating cir-
cumstance that was found by the jury .... This cannot be reconciled
with Ring."'
X. Too MUCH DISCRETION TO THE TRIAL COURT
The single most pressing and difficult question in death penalty
cases is how much weight to give to specific aggravating factors and
mitigating factors. It is the trial judge that does the ultimate weighing of
the aggravating and mitigating factors." 2 There is simply no way to
109. Bottoson v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 115, 121-22 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
110. No. 08-14402-CIV-MARTINEZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155138 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 699 F. 3d
1249, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22072 (11 th Cir. 2012). As to the Ring issue: "And, to reiterate it
one last time, the Supreme Court has told us exactly what we are to do in this situation: we must
follow the decision that directly controls, unless and until the Supreme Court makes it non-
controlling by overruling it. We understand that instruction, we have always taken it seriously, and
we follow it here." 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22072, at *42.
111. Id. at * 154-58 (citations omitted).
112. § 921.141(3) (2012).
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make these decisions consistent and rational. By giving the judge the
ability to give whatever weight he thinks necessary to every mitigating
factor, one invites wholly capricious and arbitrary actions. For example,
one judge could hear testimony about horrific child abuse, find it indeed
existed and give it little weight. Another judge could give the exact same
kind of evidence great weight. Or one judge could give great weight to
the fact that a mentally ill person's capacity to "conform her or his con-
duct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired."' I3 Another
judge could give the exact same evidence little weight. How much
weight an aggravating factor or mitigating factor will have depends
more on who the judge is than on what the evidence is. The ultimate
decision on whether to impose death depends far more on the exper-
iences, attitudes, knowledge and proclivities of the sentencing judge
than it does on the aggravation and mitigation. The comparative weight
of mitigating factors to aggravating factors is fundamental to how the
sentencing process works. And yet, there is no way in which to instruct
or review how aggravation and mitigation should be weighed. How can
this legal fact possibly survive the original complaint of "untrammeled
discretion"?'4
For example, as the Florida Supreme Court noted in Henyard v.
State: 115
The [trial] court found Henyard's age of eighteen at the time of
the crime as a statutory mitigating circumstance and accorded it
'some weight.' The trial court also found that the defendant was act-
ing under an extreme emotional disturbance and his capacity to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired and
accorded these mental mitigating factors 'very little weight.' As for
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the trial court found the fol-
lowing circumstances but accorded them 'little weight': (1) the
defendant functions at the emotional level of a thirteen year old and is
of low intelligence; (2) the defendant had an impoverished upbring-
ing; (3) the defendant was born into a dysfunctional family ... .16
Another court could easily find that these mitigating factors were com-
pelling and outweighed the aggravating factors.
Yet another example of this untrammeled discretion is the recent
case of Oyola v. State."7 In Oyola, the Supreme Court of Florida wrote:
The defense then submitted the testimony of Manuel Oyola, the
brother of Oyola. Manuel is nine years older than Oyola, and he
113. § 921.142(7)(e).
114. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
115. Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam).
116. Id. at 244 (footnote and citations omitted).
117. Oyola v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S580 (Fla. Sept. 20, 2012) (per curiam).
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remembered Oyola at a young age while Oyola was living with their
parents in Connecticut. Manuel claimed that their parents physically
abused Oyola, hitting Oyola and his siblings with belts, broomsticks,
and pointed shoes. According to Manuel, this type of physical abuse
occurred often and was so rampant that it caused Manuel, Oyola, and
their siblings to leave home around the age of fifteen.
Miguel believed that their abusive home life affected Oyola's
intellectual development during childhood by hindering Oyola's
study habits. According to Miguel, the abuse also affected the way
Oyola handled stress and emotional situations, heightening his tem-
per. Miguel also testified that Oyola began using drugs when he was
approximately twelve years old.118
In Oyola, there was also testimony by a psychologist who found
that the defendant had been treated for "a working diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia/paranoid type, which is a form of psychosis that involves hallu-
cinations and delusions."11 9 This was confirmed by Oyola's prison
mental health records. 120 There was also a significant history of mental
illness in the defendant's family.' 2' Nevertheless, the trial court "gave
slight weight to 'non-statutory mitigation [that] included serious drug
abuse, an abusive home life as a child [that] created a cycle of violence,
and mental disorder.' "1
22
There is simply no way in which to effectively review these find-
ings. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled, "Where it is clear that the
trial court has considered all evidence presented in support of a mitigat-
ing factor, the court's decision as to whether that circumstance is estab-
lished will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion."' 123 And
"[d]etermining whether a mitigating circumstance exists and the weight
to be given to existing mitigating circumstances are matters within the
discretion of the sentencing court." '24
This takes one right back to the appellant's claim in Proffitt that
there is "no guidance as to how the mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances should be weighed in any specific case." 25 That very claim was
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Proffitt. 26 [19]




122. Id. at S583 (alterations in original).
123. Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 186-87 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam),
124. Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 697 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
125. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976) (plurality opinion).
126. See id. at 255-56.
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XI. WHO IS THE PROSECUTOR?
Perhaps the single most important factor as to whether someone
will be sentenced to death is the initial decision, made with unfettered
discretion, by the prosecuting authority. After retiring from the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2012, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote:
Today one of the sources of such arbitrariness is the decision of state
prosecutors-which is not subject to review-to seek a sentence of
death. It is a discretionary call that may be influenced by the prosecu-
tor's estimate of the impact of his decision on his chances for reelec-
tion or for election to higher office.
1 27
For example, the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida (Duval, Clay,
and Nassau counties) is responsible for sentencing thirteen people to
death from 2004 to 2009.128 The Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida,
which is composed of Miami-Dade County (the largest metropolitan
area in Florida with approximately 2.5 million persons), sentenced only
four.' 29 In 2011, Duval County's per capita murder rate was 8.79
murders per 100,000 residents; Miami-Dade's was 8.66.11'
This decision to seek and impose death in a first-degree murder
case is far more a function of the current prosecutor's decisions rather
than the higher murder rate itself. 3 ' In 2010, Duval County had the
highest incarceration rate in all of Florida of any jurisdiction with more
than 500,000 residents. 132 Duval County sentenced thirteen people to
death from 2004 to 2009.1' Since the new prosecutor took over in
August 2009, there have been seventeen people sentenced to death in
Duval County. 3 4 The prosecutor in the Fourth Judicial Circuit has no
written policies or procedures as to when and how to seek the death
penalty. The prosecutor in Miami-Dade County does. There were two
people sentenced to death since 2010 in Miami-Dade County.'35 This is
127. John Paul Stevens, A Struggle with the Police & the Law, N.Y. Rev. BOOKS, Apr. 5,
2012, at 56, 56 (reviewing IRVING MORRIS, THE RAPE CASE: A YOUNG LAWYER'S STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE IN THE 1950s (2011)).
128. Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L.
Rev. 227, 232 & n.15 (2012).
129. Id. at 242 & n.96.
130. Dana Treen, Violent crime rates drop but Duval edges to top in Florida murders for 2011,
JACKSONVILLE.COM (May 1, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://jacksonville.comnnews/crimeY2012-04-30/
story/violent-crime-rates-drop-duval-edges-top-florida-murders-201 1.
131. See Michael Hallett & Daniel Pontzer, No Peace Dividend for Duval? Posing Questions
About Jacksonville's Civic Infrastructure, SMART JUST. J., Spring 2012, at 1, 10-11, available at
http://www. unf.edu/uploadedfiles/aa/coas/ccj/faculty/hallet-no-peace-dividend-for_duval.pdf.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Smith, supra note 128, at 232 & n.15.
134. See Death Row Roster, FLA. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/active
inmates/deathrowroster.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
135. See id.
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because there is no legislation or statewide regulation of prosecutors.
Nor is there any mechanism in place to ensure that, statewide, the same
criteria and factors are considered as to when to seek or waive death.
Rather, the elected prosecutor in each of the twenty judicial circuits of
Florida can make different decisions as whether to seek death in the first
instance, whether to waive death in return for a plea, or not to waive the
death penalty. State law does not require state attorneys' offices to have
any written policies regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It
is up to each prosecutor as to when and what they will do when at least
one of the statutory aggravating factors exists.
Thus, where the crime is committed in Florida, who the prosecutor
is in that jurisdiction, what that prosecutor's attitudes are with respect to
the death penalty, and whether the prosecutor is facing reelection will
have a much greater impact on the decision as to whether a person
should receive a life or death sentence. 3 6 There is no objectivity in this
kind of decision-making process.
XII. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS OF THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
In Proffitt, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote:
[T]o assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capri-
ciously selected group of convicted defendants[,] [t]he Supreme
Court of Florida reviews each death sentence to ensure that similar
results are reached in similar cases.
In fact, it is apparent that the Florida court has undertaken responsi-
bility to perform its function of death sentence review with a maxi-
mum of rationality and consistency.137
Each case "is reviewed and reweighed by the Supreme Court of Florida
'to determine independently whether the imposition of the ultimate pen-
alty is warranted.' "38
According to a study by Professor James Liebman and others, the
reversal rate on direct appeal for Florida death penalty cases was 49%
between 1973 and 1995, and it was 17% for state post-conviction
litigation.139
Now, however, "the Florida Supreme Court's average rate of vacat-
136. See Stevens, supra note 127, at 56.
137. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1976) (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 253 (quoting Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1975)).
139. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1975, at 45, 48 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Grp., Paper No. 15, 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=232712.
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ing death sentences significantly decreased from 20 percent for the
1989-1999 time period to 4 percent for the 2000-2003 time period."'
14
1
There has been a gradually decreasing number of reversals (with some
oscillation) since 1989.141
How does one account for this? According to the ABA report,
"political pressure from the executive and legislative branches regarding
the disposition of death penalty appeals and the changing composition of
the Court appear to have caused the court to engage in a less vigorous
proportionality review and, in turn, vacate fewer death sentences on pro-
portionality grounds."' 2 Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court only
reviews cases in which the death penalty has been imposed and com-
pares them with other cases in which it was imposed but reversed.'
14 3
The Florida Supreme Court does not look for cases in which the death
penalty was imposed compared to cases in which the death penalty was
waived before trial.1
The ABA report went on to say that:
[Tihe Florida Supreme Court is no longer holding true to its own rule
that proportionality review should be a "qualitative review.., of the
underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator" and not simply a
comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. Because the Court uses a "precedent-seeking" or "com-
parative culpability" approach in its proportionality review, which
limits its review only to cases in which a death sentence has been
imposed, the Court must determine what "level of aggravation is suf-
ficiently low" and what "level of mitigation is sufficiently high to
raise concerns of arbitrariness."145
In the ABA report's chapter entitled "Direct Appeal Process," rec-
ommendation number one was:
In order to (1) ensure that the death penalty is being administered in a
rational, non-arbitrary, manner, [and] (2) provide a check on broad
prosecutorial discretion, . . . direct appeals courts should engage in
meaningful proportionality review that includes cases in which a
death sentence was imposed, cases in which the death penalty was
sought but not imposed, and cases in which the death penalty could
have been sought but was not. 
146
140. ABA PROJECT, supra note 52, at 212.
141. See Phillip L. Durham, Review in Name Alone: The Rise and Fall of Comparative
Proportionality Review of Capital Sentences by the Supreme Court of Florida, 17 S'r. THOMAS L.
REV. 299, 318 Figure 1 (2004).
142. -ABA PROJECT, supra note 52, at 213 (citing Durham, supra note 141, at 343-48).
143. See id. at 212-13.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 213 (footnotes omitted).
146. Id. at 212.
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The proportionality review promised by Proffitt has been significantly
reduced by the politics and the personalities involved in the death pen-
alty. This too has had a significant effect on the expansion of the types
of cases in which the death penalty can be sought and imposed.
XIII. WHO IS THE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND How DOES SHE
ALLOCATE HER LIMITED RESOURCES?
Nearly every person facing death receives a public defender
because it is rare that anyone can afford to pay the many and large costs
of a capital case. The amount of money that should be afforded someone
facing death is significant. The American Bar Association's Guidelines
for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Pen-
alty Cases lays out the many things that must be done by lawyers pre-
paring for a death penalty case: extensive records gathering, extensive
client interviewing (often requiring overcoming the barriers of shame or
denial), mental health evaluations, potential witness interviews, and
reviews of medical history, family and social history, educational his-
tory, military history, employment history, and juvenile history.147 As
stated in the ABA's guidelines, "The collection of corroborating infor-
mation from multiple sources-a time consuming task-is important
wherever possible to ensure the reliability and thus persuasiveness of the
evidence." '48
The guidelines also require a mitigation specialist and that "[t]he
defense team should contain at least one member qualified... to screen
individuals for the presence of mental or psychological disorders
.... "149 All this mitigation work requires significant time and funding.
It is necessary for a presentation of all of the mitigating evidence availa-
ble so that a sentencer can make a full and informed decision on whether
to sentence someone to death. Therefore, a public defender's office must
have the funds, resources, and personnel available to meet the demands
of a death penalty case.
Public defender offices in Florida are not funded adequately to do
what is necessary to prepare and litigate all the death penalty cases that
are assigned to them. 5 Public defenders must choose where to spend
the limited funds that are appropriated to them. Death penalty cases,
when litigated properly, can take much, if not most, of those limited
147. Am. Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1016-26 (2003).
148. Id. at 1025.
149. Id. at 952.
150. See Roberta G. Mandel, The Appointment of Counsel to Indigent Defendants Is Not
Enough: Budget Cuts Render the Right to Counsel Virtually Meaningless, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2009, at
43, 44.
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resources.5 1
In 2008 in Duval County, for example, a newly elected public
defender fired very experienced and seasoned assistant public defenders
and replaced them with far less experienced lawyers. 152 This was, in
part, because the capital lawyers made too much money compared to
other assistant public defenders. In making the decision to save money
or to use it differently, public defenders may have to hire people far less
qualified to handle capital cases. Statewide, each public defender has to
make critical decisions as to how much of its allotted budget can and
should be spent on very expensive death penalty litigation.
In Florida there is simply not enough money allocated to handle
capital cases in the ways required by the ABA's standards. 53 And,
given these financial constraints, who the public defender is, what kind
of lawyers she hires, and the kinds of preparation skills the hired lawyers
have are critical to death penalty litigation.
As discussed above, the justice system relies on lawyers who are
paid and experienced enough to do all the things necessary to present to
the jury everything that it needs to know in order to make a full, well-
informed, and intelligent decision as to whether a defendant deserves
life or death. Most death penalty cases involve extensive litigation,
investigation, and preparation. Again, according to the ABA's guide-
lines, attorneys spend twelve times as much time on a capital case as a
non-capital first-degree murder case and "recent studies indicate that
several thousand hours are typically required to provide appropriate rep-
resentation."1 54 In federal capital cases that proceeded to trial from 1990
to 1997, the total number of attorney hours spent averaged 1,889.155
In the Miami-Dade Public Defender's Office, there are currently
nine cases for each lawyer in the Capital Litigation Unit.' 56 This case
load exceeds the number of cases that would ensure that the "workload
of attorneys representing defendants in death penalty cases is maintained
at a level that enables counsel to provide each client with high quality
legal representation. ' 157 The Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil
Regional Counsel (OCCCRC), which is the backup office for conflicts
151. See Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don't Say About the High
Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Fall 1994), http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/node/599.
152. See Gwynedd Stuart, Courting Disaster, FoLio WKLY. (Dec. 16, 2008), http:/Iwww.
folioweekly.com/documents/Decemberl62008.pdf.
153. See Mandel, supra note 150, at 44.
154. Am. Bar Ass'n,Guidelines supra note 147, at 968.
155. Id. At 965
156. Conversation with Edith Georgi, Co-coordinator, Capital Litigation Unit, Office of the
Public Defender in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida.
157. Am. Bar Ass'n Guidelines, supra note 147, at 965-969.
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filed by the public defender in Miami-Dade, is (as of late 2012) not
taking new capital appointments and will move to have itself removed as
counsel on existing capital cases because, given the limited resources
allocated, it cannot provide effective assistance of counsel.158
XIV. FURTHER LEGISLATIVE AND BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS
If the Public Defender and OCCCRC both conflict, then the case
will go to private court-appointed counsel. 159 Under current law, the
maximum amount the Justice Administration Commission will pay for a
death penalty case at the trial level is $15,000.160 One can only go over
this cap if granted permission from a judge. 16 1 And there are extensive
procedures in place to prove that one was required to exceed the statu-
tory cap (e.g., affidavits, review by the Justice Administrative Commis-
sion, an evidentiary hearing). 162 If one can prove that "extraordinary and
unusual efforts" were necessary, then one can receive $100.00 per hour
for additional hours necessary. 63 One cannot bill for any interim
expenses and must wait until the case is completed to receive payment
(even though capital cases routinely go on for far more than a year).
1 64
In 2012, the Florida Legislature amended section 27 of the Florida Stat-
utes which now provides that if the money allotted to pay the expenses
of attorneys fees exceeds the amount appropriated for this purpose, then
the funds shall be paid by the Justice Administrative Commission165 -in
other words, the courts' budget. This creates an obvious conflict of inter-
est 1 66 because a judge will have to measure her budget against a defen-
dant's right to effective representation. Another effect of this legislation
is that better lawyers will get off the appointment list because of the
disincentive to register.
XV, ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
The state has a financial incentive to file death penalty cases, even
if, in the end, the death penalty will be waived. There is they have a
158. Conversation with Kelly Peterson, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional
Counsel in the 11 th Judicial Circuit of Florida.
159. See FLA. STAT. § 27.5304 (2012).




164. See id. In Federal court, a lawyer is currently paid $178 per hour and there is no cap. 7A
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 630.10.10 (2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/vol7/Vol-07.pdf.
165. § 27.5304(12)(f(2).
166. Miami Dade Circuit Court Judge Victoria Sigler indeed found this to be a conflict of
interest in State v. Martin, Fl1-003648, at *5-6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 24, 2012).
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much better chance of getting much needed state funding if they have
forty death cases as opposed to twenty death cases on their books. If the
prosecutor does not seek death, other prosecutors in the state will get
money and she will not. Who the individual prosecutor is in the same
office will oftentimes will determine whether it is a death case or not.
Different prosecutors have different perspectives on the same case.
67
Another factor in whether a case is a death penalty case is the
wishes of the victim's family as well as those of the police involved.
Who the victims are in the case, whether they loudly vocalize their con-
cerns, and whether they are forgiving or angry will have a significant
impact on the prosecutor's decision as to whether to try and resolve the
case short of death. By law, the state must consider the views of the
victim. 6 s Does this narrow or expand the field of those eligible?
Another important decisionmaker is the lead detective and other police
witnesses on the case. Does the detective want the death penalty or not?
How determined is the police officer and will he push strongly for the
imposition of death? Again, politically, a prosecutor would create
problems for him or herself if he or she did not consult with, and often
defer to, the policemen involved in the case. These are just some of the
everyday realities of the death penalty world.
XVI. CONCLUSION
Given all these factors and variables at play, one must concede that
Proffitt has not narrowed the number of death penalty cases in any
meaningful way in Florida. One must also concede that the death penalty
is sought and imposed arbitrarily and-dare it be said?-capriciously.
These many factors and systemic failures led Justice Blackmun-
who dissented in Furman and who joined the pluralities in the Gregg
and Proffitt decisions-to say years later in Callins v. Collins:'69
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death
penalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or
not at all, and, despite the effort of the States and courts to devise
legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge,
the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination,
caprice, and mistake. This is not to say that the problems with the
death penalty today are identical to those that were present 20 years
ago. Rather, the problems that were pursued down one hole with pro-
167. In one case in Miami-Dade, one prosecutor had the case for two years and it was not a
capital case. Another prosecutor received the case and filed a death notice. A third prosecutor
inherited the case and did not think it was capital. A fourth prosecutor has not yet decided whether
it is capital.
168. Fla.Stat. § 960.0021 (2012).
169. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (denying certiorari).
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cedural rules and verbal formulas have come to the surface some-
where else, just as virulent and pernicious as they were in their
original form. Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of
eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration
of death can never be achieved without compromising an equally
essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized
sentencing.
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machin-
ery of death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I
have struggled-along with a majority of this Court, to develop pro-
cedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere
appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor .... I feel mor-
ally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death pen-
alty experiment has failed. 170
In April 2008, in Baze v. Rees,17 ' Justice Stevens, who also joined
the plurality in Gregg and Proffitt in upholding the death penalty, stated:
Our decisions in 1976 upholding the constitutionality of the
death penalty relied heavily on our belief that adequate procedures
were in place that would avoid the danger of discriminatory applica-
tion identified by Justice Douglas' opinion in Furman, of arbitrary
application identified by Justice Stewart, and of excessiveness identi-
fied by Justices Brennan and Marshall. In subsequent years a number
of our decisions relied on the premise that "death is different" from
every other form of punishment to justify rules minimizing the risk of
error in capital cases. Ironically, however, more recent cases have
endorsed procedures that provide less protections to capital defend-
ants than to ordinary offenders.'
72
In 1997, the American Bar Association, which has no policy on the
death penalty per se, passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association calls upon each
jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment not to carry out the
death penalty until the jurisdiction implements policies and proce-
dures that are consistent with the following longstanding American
Bar Association policies intended to (1) ensure that death penalty
cases are administered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due
process, and (2) minimize the risk that innocent persons may be
executed:
(i) Implementing ABA "Guidelines for the Appointment and Per-
formance of Counsel in Death penalty Cases" (adopted Feb. 1989)
170. Id. at 1143-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (footnote and
citations omitted).
171. 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted),
(Vol. 67:413
THE FALSE PROMISE OF PROFFITT
and Association policies intended to encourage competency of coun-
sel in capital cases (adopted Feb. 1979, Feb. 1988, Feb. 1990, Aug.
1996);
(ii) Preserving, enhancing, and streamlining state and federal courts'
authority and responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the
merits of constitutional claims in state post-conviction and federal
habeas corpus proceedings (adopted Aug. 1982, Feb. 1990);
(iii) Striving to eliminate discrimination in capital sentencing on the
basis of the race of either the victim or the defendant ....
The prominent American Law Institute concluded this past year
that it would no longer attempt to write an update dealing with capital
punishment in its Model Penal Code because of the "current intractable
institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate
system for administering capital punishment." 174 The following state-
ment was submitted to the ALI citing the reasons why it should adopt
that new policy:
The foregoing review of the unsuccessful efforts to constitution-
ally regulate the death penalty, the difficulties that continue to under-
mine its administration, and the structural and institutional obstacles
to curing those ills forms the basis of our recommendation to the
Institute. The longstanding recognition of these underlying defects in
the capital justice process, the inability of extensive constitutional
regulation to redress those defects, and the immense structural barri-
ers to meaningful improvement all counsel strongly against the Insti-
tute's undertaking a law reform project on capital punishment, either
in the form of a new draft of § 210.6 or a more extensive set of
proposals. Rather, these conditions strongly suggest that the Institute
recognize that the preconditions for an adequately administered
regime of capital punishment do not currently exist and cannot rea-
sonably be expected to be achieved.175
Stevens, Blackmun, the ABA, and the ALI all address the flaws of
the death penalty nationwide. But, as we have seen, the law and applica-
tion of the death penalty is far worse in Florida. Regardless of one's
beliefs in the moral acceptability of the death penalty in theory, the legal
173. AM. BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION 1 (Feb. 3, 1997) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/201 1_build/death-penalty-moratoriunl
aba-policy-consistency97.authcheckdam.pdf.
174. Debra Cassens Weiss, ALl Disavows Its Death Penalty Framework, A.B.A. J. (Jan.
5, 2010, 7:31 AM), http:/lwww.abajournal.comlnews/article/ali_disavowsjts-deathpenalty_
framework (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Report to the ALl Concerning Capital Punishment,
in REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON THE
MAT-rER OF THE DEATH PENALTY, at Annex B 1, 49 (2009), available at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/alicoun.pdf.
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and practical worlds of death are simply too arbitrary and flawed. There
are too many variables in play and the net is ever widening, not narrow-
ing. The death penalty in Florida still strikes like lightning.
